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I 
LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY 
CENTER FOR 
CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 
Nancy Beth Cruzan and the Death of the Self 
Two issues seem destined to be 
perennially before the Supreme Court of 
the United States, in one form or another, 
in the foreseeable future. Both have 
been attracting an extraordinary amount 
Jf interest from lawyers, ethicists, physi-
cians, and ordinary citizens, an interest 
mainly derived from the fact that they 
express a profoundly divided country 
with feelings running high on both sides. 
Rarely has the makeup of the Court 
seemed so pivotal. 
These issues reflect a division within the 
Court itselfwhich echoes the mood ofthe 
country. Even though the Court has 
spoken, the conflicts remain. Either the 
decisions must perforce seem ambigu-
ous, or one side or the other, perhaps 
both, will feel that bad law has been 
affirmed. Can one expect pro-choice, 
abortion advocates to accept quietly a 
Court decision that abandons Wade vs. 
Roe, or that an affirmation of that earlier 
Court decision is going to get the pro-life 
forces off the streets and off the front 
steps of "family planning" centers? Either 
side is likely to catch its breath for a while 
and then plunge anew into the fray. 
The other issue, the right to die, while 
generating less public heat at present is 
in many ways just as crucial. It will 
undoubtedly continue to be with us in 
spite ofthe Court's non-decision regard-
ing the case of persistent vegetative 
\lancy Beth Cruzan. No clear consensus 
was to be expected from the Court so 
long as it reflected the lack of consensus 
of the larger society. 
By 
Jack W. Provonsha, M.D., Ph.D. 
Professor Emeritus 
Faculty of Religion 
Lorna Linda University 
What is often unrecognized is that the 
tensions raised by these issues repre-
sent deep disagreements regarding the 
theological and philosophical presup-
positions underlying them. They have 
long roots extending into the past. It is the 
purpose of this paper to uncover these 
roots and to suggest a point of view that, 
superimposed upon them, could offer at 
least a measure of hope for downshifting 
the current tension level. 
At issue is the central question, "What 
constitutes a human being?" My former 
teacher, Paul Lehmann, then of Harvard 
Divinity School, defined the ethical enter-
prise in terms of that question. Lehmann 
wrote in his Ethics In A Christian Context 
that ethics has to do with "what God is 
doing in the world to make and to keep 
human life human." Hovering in the 
immediate background of an ethic so 
defined there lies, of course, another 
even more fundamental question. "What 
do we mean when we say human?" How 
we answer this question will determine 
how we deal with the pressing issues at 
both the beginning and ending edges of 
life. 
Dr. Joseph Fletcher, one of America's 
pioneer Protestant bioethicists, once 
wrote: 
In biomedical ethics writers con-
stantly say that we need to explicate 
humanness or humaneness, what it 
means to be a truly human being, but 
they never follow their admission of 
the need with an actual inventory or 
profile, no matter how tentatively offer-
ed. Yet this must be done, or at least 
attempted. 
Then Dr. Fletcher, typically never hesi-
tant about rushing past timorous angels, 
proposed his own tentative profile. It 
contained fifteen positive and five nega-
tive criteria. They ranged from minimal 
intelligence to possessing neocortical 
function, with a variety of features we 
usually associate with human as con-
trasted with subhuman animals, in bet-
ween. (The boldness with which he 
categorized humanness on the IQ scale 
was astonishing. Below twenty an indi-
vidual is not a person. Between twenty 
and forty he is questionably a person.) 
Reactions to his article were both 
immediate and forceful. After consider-
able give-and-take Dr. Fletcher settled 
on the possession of neocortical function 
as the fundamental humanizing trait. 
Whether or not we consider Dr. Fletcher 
as having been successful, his attempt 
was not misplaced. He was correct in 
saying that at least we must try. What 
follows is offered as such an effort. 
There are three ways of understand-
ing humanity that condition the present 
situation. The oldest came to be asso-
ciated with the name of Greek philos-
opher Plato, not because he originated 
the idea but because he gave it one of its 
clearest early expressions. Listen to him 
in his Socratic dialogue, Phaedo. 
Socrates, who is preparing to drink the 
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lethal hemlock, is conversing with his 
disciples who are anguished at his immi-
nent departure. He is trying to reassure 
them: 
"Well then," added Socrates, "let us 
suppose that there are two sorts of 
existence-one seen, the other un-
seen ... and further, is not one part of us 
body, another part soul?" 
"To be sure." 
"And to which class is the body 
more alike and akin?" 
"Clearly to the seen-no one can 
doubt that." 
"And is the soul seen or not seen?" 
"Not by man, Socrates." 
"That soul, I say, herself invisible, 
departs to the invisible world-to the 
divine and immortal and rational: 
.. .Then when death attacks a man, the 
mortal portion of him may be sup-
posed to die, but the immortal retires at 
the approach of death and is pre-
served safe and sound." 
Later, Crito is concerned about the 
burial of Socrates. 
"We shall try our best to do as you 
say," said Crito, "but how shall we bury 
you?" 
"Any way you like," replied Socrates, 
"that is, if you can catch me and I don't 
slip through your fingers." He laughed 
gently as he spoke, and turning to us 
went on: "I cannot persuade Crito that I 
am this Socrates who is here talking to 
you ... ; he thinks I am the one whom he 
will see presently lying dead.... You 
must give assurance to Crito for 
me ... that when I am dead I shall not 
stay but depart and be gone. That will 
help Crito to bear more easily ... when 
he sees my body being burned or 
buried, as if something dreadful were 
happening to me .... No, you must keep 
up your spirits and say that it is only my 
body that you are burying; and you can 
bury it as you please." 
This is Platonic dualism. What it really 
represents, however, is a monistic reduc-
tion of the essential man to a soul or 
psyche. A modern expression of this 
psychic reduction is provided by Elisa-
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beth Kubler-Ross, of Death and Dying 
fame, who speaks of having collected 
cases from all over the world, "hundreds 
of cases from Australia to California," all 
sharing a common denominator: 
They are all aware of shedding their 
physical body. And death, as we 
understand it in scientific language, 
does not really exist. Death is simply a 
shedding of the physical body like the 
butterfly coming out of a cocoon ... the 
only thing you lose is something you 
don't need anymore, and that is your 
physical body. It is like putting away 
your winter coat when spring comes 
and you know that the coat is too 
shabby to wear it anymore. That's 
virtually what death is all about." 
The cases to which Kubler-Ross 
refers are autoscopic, "near-death" 
experiences of individuals who have 
been resuscitated from cardiac or pul-
monary arrest, and the like. About ten 
percent of such persons report varia-
tions on a theme provided by one of 
Kubler-Ross's patients: 
Mrs. S had been in and out of the 
intensive-care unit 15 times, never 
expected to live, but always made a 
comeback. In one of her hospitaliza-
tions she could not get to Chicago, and 
she was hospitalized at a local hos-
pital. She remembers being put in a 
private room, very close to death, and 
could not make up her mind whether 
she should call the nurse because she 
suddenly sensed that she was mo-
ments away from death. One part of 
her wanted very much to lean back in 
the pillows and finally be at peace. But 
the other part of her needed to make it 
through one more time because her 
youngest son was not yet of age. 
Before she made a decision to call the 
nurse, a nurse apparently walked into 
her room, took one look at her, and 
dashed out. 
At that moment, she saw herself 
floating a few feet above her body. She 
was very surprised at seeing her 
corpse in that bed. She made funny 
remarks about how pale she looked, 
and then to her utter amazement, she 
described in minute details how they 
worked on her, who was in the room 
first, who was last, what they wore, 
what they said-she even repeated a 
joke of one of the residents who was 
very apprehensive and started to joke. 
In the meantime, while everybody 
worked very desperately to bring her 
back to physical life she floated a few 
feet above her body and had only one 
need, one wish-to tell them down 
there, "Cool it, relax, take it easy, it's 
OK." 
Similar accounts are fairly common. 
Unfortunately for a literal interpretation 
of these psychic reductions there are a 
number of other circumstances besides 
resuscitation from "near-death" that can 
produce the phenomenon-anesthesia, 
psychedelic drugs such as LSD, a vari-
ety of other toxic substances. One 
patient I interviewed had a small pituitary 
tumor. His only apparent abnormal find-
ing was an elevated serum prolactin 
level. Fifteen times over a ten-year per-
iod he had out-of-the-body experiences. 
These ceased after the removal of his 
tumor. One of my medical students con-
fessed to experiencing out-of-the-body 
autoscopy on five different occasions for 
no reason he could think of. They just 
happened; no drugs, no anesthesia, no 
tumors, no near-death. 
One study suggests a naturalistic 
explanation. L. J. Meduna repeatedly 
encountered the phenomenon with his 
experiments on the effects of administra-
tion of various levels of carbon-dioxide 
on otherwise normal subjects. Since 
carbon-dioxide is one of the products 0 
tissue metabolism, loss of circulation as 
in cardiac arrest could produce an 
accumulation of this substance, at least 
until such metabolism ceased-long 
enough to produce illusions or hallucina-
tions to be subsequently recalled. 
Whatever the explanation, these 
experiences suggest an understanding 
of man in which he is only loosely and 
temporarily associated with a material 
body. The ethical questions arising from 
this point of view have to do with when 
that association begins and when it ends 
and are asked such as "When does life 
begin?" and "When does life end?" 
An opposing understanding of man, 
while not confined to it, is largely a child 
of our modern scientific, materialistic, 
world-view. In this view, man is essential-
ly little more than a functioning material 
body. We speak of this as a somatic 
reduction. From this perspective ques-
tions regarding the beginning and end-
ing of life are questions directed at the 
material body. The beginning may be 
considered in terms of developmental 
m atu rity. At the end i ng, all present defi n i-
tions of death are somatic definitions-
cellular disintegration death, organ sys· 
tem death with its loss of vital signs, ana 
Continued on page 7 
Ethics Courses: 
Useless 
New York Times, Nov. 15, 1989 
By 
Michael Levin 
Let a stockbroker be arrested for shady dealing or a new medical 
rocedure pose unanticipated dilemmas, and there arises a de-
and for a course in ethics. Law schools, medical schools, business 
schools - even high schools - are urged to stem a supposed 
flood of immorality by instituting the study of right and wrong. Un-
fortunately, however, these ethics courses are an utterly pointless 
exercise. 
The idea behind them is that anyone can be taught to distinguish 
right from wrong in much the way medical students are taught to 
distinguish the pancreas from the liver. 
In the typical course, the center of pedagogic gravity is the case 
study. Maya poor man steal medicine for his ailing wife? Should 
the young mother of three or the productive scientist get the only 
dialysis machine? Having mastered moral distinctions from this 
regimen, the graduate is then supposed able to recognize (and 
resist) a dubious deal or an improper request from a superior. 
But this whole exercise rests on a mistake about what makes 
people good. Moral behavior is the product of training, not reflec-
tion. As Aristotle stressed thousands of years ago, you get a good 
adult by habituating a good child to do the right thing. Praise for 
truth-telling and sanctions for fibbing will, in time, make him "natural-
Iy" honest. 
"Telling right from wrong in 
everyday life is not that 
hard; the hard part is over-
coming laziness and cow-
ardice." 
Indeed, abstract knowledge of right and wrong no more con-
tributes to character than knowledge of physics contributes to bicy-
cling. The idea in both cases is to build the proper responses into 
nerve and sinew: Bicyclists don't have to think about which way 
to lean and honest men don't have to think how to answer under 
oath. 
There is certainly a place for philosophical reflection on the ex-
istence and nature of values. But its practical significance is nil. 
Telling right from wrong in everyday life is not that hard; the hard 
part is overcoming laziness and cowardice to do what one perfectly 
well knows one should. As every parent learns, only good examples 
and apt incentives can induce that strength. 
Psychologists have laboriously rediscovered the common sense 
observation that children first conceive morality as rules for pleas-
ing their parents - only with the fullness of time comes a grasp 
of the idea of conscientious choice. 
For this very reason, conscience cannot be hurried into being 
by exposing children to hard, unclear examples for which they are 
unready. Honesty may not always be the best policy, but telling 
a child as much only confuses him. To stick, morality must be taught 
as if absolute; life will supply the qualifications. 
So ethics education carries more disquieting implications than 
merely the waste of everyone's time. The hard cases meant to shat-
ter student complacency invariably involve conflict between con-
ventional principles, such as property rights and life-saving in the 
case of the sick wife. Dwelling on these conflicts strongly suggests 
that conventional morality is incoherent and, consequently, not ra-
tionally binding. Ethics education thereby provides one more 
excuse for shirking one's plain duties. 
Second, the examples typical of ethics education courses divert 
attention from the content of morality proper. Moral character does 
not require any particular stance on any public issue, be it pollu-
tion or apartheid. Honesty, industry and respect for others form 
the gyroscope that stabilizes an individual on his journey through 
life, not an itinerary of policy positions. 
Yet ethics education, inspired as it is by public events, tends to 
focus on public action: How should profit be weighed against pollu-
tion? When maya government official blow the whistle? These are 
interesting and difficult questions but are not likely to be faced by 
many people. 
Less intriguing but cumulatively more important for the character 
of society are each day's micro-challenges, such as deciding 
whether to save a Christmas bonus or go on a spree. 
A complex world does present special moral puzzles. But ethics 
educators risk being so many Poloniuses, adding nothing to the 
subjects they address while discrediting counsel itself. 
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Teaching Ethics Is Vital 
By 
Sydney Allen, Ph.D. 
Professor of Philosophy and 
Religious Studies 
San Bernardino Valley College 
San Bernardino, California 
Can "bioethics" be taught? What is "bioethics"? It is the branch 
of ethics that deals with questions of health, medicine, life and 
death. Can "ethics" be taught? What is "ethics"? It is the branch of 
philosophy that seeks to find a standard for human conduct. 
Educators often divide the things that can be taught into 
(a) cognitive; (b) affective and (c) skills domains. 
Does the body of knowledge in ethics or moral philosophy 
contain cognitive elements? Yes. The moral thought of Plato, 
Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls is 
cognitive, and can be explained, memorized, taught, and learned. 
Does ethics contain an affective domain? Yes. People who 
would apply moral thought usefully must have a "moral imagina-
tion," which comes down to the ability to trade places with another 
person, possibly in another place and time, and to sympathize 
and/or empathize with that person. Literature and art are useful in 
this respect. Through the art of music, for instance, we can learn to 
"feel with" the people who split Europe down the middle for the 
sake of the reforms they "felt" necessary in the sixteenth-century 
church: both the poetic text and the music of "A Mighty Fortress Is 
Our God" offer us this opportunity. 
Is there a skill component in ethics? Yes. If we are to use the 
utilitarian calculus passed on to us by Mill and his disciples, we 
must learn to find the net balance of some value (pleasure, for 
example) vis-a-vis its co-ordinate disvalue (pain, for example) that 
is likely to result from the various acts that are available to us in 
response to a particular situation. If there is no such net balance of 
value, we must be able to reject the act in question. If we are to use 
the deontological system passed on to us by such thinkers as Kant 
and Rawls, we must be able to explain how the "sacrifices," that is, 
discomforts, suffered by lawyers, doctors, and undertakers are 
somehow compensated for by the increased earnings these peo-
ple currently get in our society, whereas the "sacrifices" that 
slaves were once called upon to suffer were not compensated 
with the coin of advantage that their labors gave society. There is, 
in other words, a kind of calculus in moral matters that both the Mill 
and Kant traditions require one to master. 
"The institution where moral virtue is 
learned is much less often the school than 
it is the family." 
But, having mastered the cognitive, affective, and skills 
domains within the subject matter of ethics, will the student be a 
better person, citizen, parent, child, and so forth? Possibly not. 
Worse still, those who do master the lessons can, if they have a 
bad will, turn what they have learned to the purposes of crime. We 
are on the borderline of family and religion here, where they 
overlap philosophy. 
That, it seems to me, is the point that Professor Levin is trying to 
make. He may have had in mind the recent injection into schools 
that turn out MBAs of courses in "Business Ethics" in the hope that 
the graduates who take these diplomas out onto the trading floors 
of Wall Street will refrain from fraud and insider trading. 
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He suggests that such courses are virtually useless in that kind 
of situation, and he is probably near the truth. Schools that train 
MBAs are teaching people how to make as much profit as possi-
ble in a situation, and when one of the classes suggests that on( 
ought to take less profit than possible-for the sake of morality-iL 
is not as likely to govern the conduct of the students in later life as 
are the other classes that tell them how to take over companies, 
turn them into "cash cows," and milk them for profit. 
Can "virtue" be taught? Can honesty, kindness, and courage be 
taught? Let us distinguish between what we may call "didactic" 
and "apprenticeship." Logic and Chemisty are most appro-
priately taught by a teacher lecturing, explaining, and drilling stu-
dents on the body of knowledge represented in these fields. 
Aspects of clinical medicine and violin-bow making are more 
appropriately taught by apprenticeship, that is, by novices observ-
ing masters, then trying the procedure under the direction of the 
master and eventually becoming masters themselves. The latter 
resembles a home or a priory more than a lecture hall. 
As Professor Levin suggests, the institution where moral virtue 
is learned is much less often the school than it is the family itself, 
where most commonly it is learned (if it is learned) by daughters 
from their mothers and by sons from their fathers. The family in 
which mothers, fathers, sons and daughters engage in this vital 
learning process is not, as some have claimed to believe, a 
dispensable, expendable institution for humanity. Those who are 
acquainted with such influential moral codes as the Ten Com-
mandments will not be surprised to be told this. One of the impor-
tant rules of the Mosaic Law commands sons and daughters to 
honor their fathers and mothers. Many sons and daughters 
have been forced, for one reason or another, to do without their 
birth mothers or birth fathers or both, but it is not until recently that 
people have begun to argue that those bereaved children were 
not harmed thereby. The family square-mother, father, daugh 
ters, sons-has proved its usefulness in the past and continue~ 
to prove it today. Virtuous parents tend to be blessed with virtuous 
children. The transmission of the virtue is not by didactic but 
by imitation. Rudyard Kipling spoke to this issue in one of his 
"Stalky and Company" stories. He describes a talk given at col-
lege by an "impeccably conservative M.P." on the subject of the 
virtue of patriotism: 
With a large and healthy hand he tore down ... veils, and 
trampled them under the well-intentioned foot of eloquence. In a 
raucous voice he cried aloud little matters like the hope of 
Honour and the dream of Glory, that boys do not discuss even 
with their most intimate equals .... He pointed to them shining 
goals, with fingers which smudged out all radiance on all hori-
zons. He profaned the most secret places of their souls with 
outcries and gesticulations(1). 
Immanuel Kant claimed that the only thing that can, without 
condition, be called "good" is a good will. The process of the 
formation of such a benign will is probably destined to remain 
behind the veils to which Kipling points. Its importance, however, 
cannot be too highly rated, and neither can the importance of 
whole families with good mothers and fathers as the workshop 
where it is learned. 
Can bioethics be taught? Certainly. Teaching ethics is vital and 
helpful, but it has little to do with the formation of virtue. For that we 
must look to our parents and our religious life. 
Endnotes 
1. Carrington, C.E., The Life of Rudyard Kipling (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), p. 218. The 
quotation is from "Stalky and Company." 
A Medical Ethics Course? 
By 
Cynthia Gordon, Ph. D. 
Lecturer 
Department of Philosophy 
University of California/Riverside 
The anti-academic academician is a frequent visitor to the 
op-ed pages. He delights the general reader by reinforcing the 
view that "book learning" is largely futile and what really counts 
are the down-to-earth, common-sensical lessons of "the real 
world." If anything, he suggests, academic study blurs the clear 
vision of plain experience. Such a writer may begin with a legiti-
mate point. But he has so much fun tweaking the noses of his 
colleagues that the message becomes a series of cheap shots. 
Consider the example of Michael Levin's essay "Ethics 
Courses: Useless." In the middle of his discussion, he invokes 
Aristotelian ethical theory, but offers an account of it that has more 
in common with the views of B. F. Skinner than those of Aristotle. In 
his distaste for "intellectualizing" about morals, Levin forgets that 
Aristotle distinguished between an acquired pattern of correct 
behaviors and an intelligent grasp of ethical principles, arguing 
that moral life in the fullest sense required both. Even more funda-
mentally, Aristotle's view of ethical development is not the only 
game in town. Whether in the history of moral philosophy or in 
contemporary psychology, there are equally attractive theories 
stressing a cognitive or affective interpretation of how one 
becomes an ethical being. 
Elsewhere in his essay, Levin faults academic study of ethics for 
suggesting "that conventional morality is incoherent." Often, how-
ever, that is the problematic truth. Popular morality and individual 
moral codes are frequently lacking in basic, explanatory princi-
ples. The ethics of a person or a group may consist of a bundle of 
moral opinions that include contradictions and absurdities 
("Respect life or I'll kill you!"). Those of us who teach basic ethics 
courses urge our students not to give up their convictions, but to 
systematize them, to work toward clarity and coherence in their 
functioning as ethical persons. The study of theories and the 
analysis of value dilemmas is not to create confusion, but to 
resolve it. 
It is tempting to go after Levin's article line by line. However, our 
primary focus here is the question "Can Biomedical Ethics Be 
Taught?" If such study is not "an utterly pointless exercise," what 
does it accomplish? Levin would argue quite correctly that a 
bioethics course cannot make a bad person good. It cannot trans-
form a sociopathic medical student into a morally sensitive physi-
cian. What can occur will depend on the nature ofthe course. I, for 
example, can only describe the aims of my own medical ethics 
classes, an agenda that succeeds just often enough to keep the 
instructor hopeful. 
"Right living or ethics has first to do with 
good habits." 
While it is true that no academic experience ever devised can 
compel a moral sensitivity where none exists, that is not the 
..Iproblem with the vast majority of students. They want to be good 
people. They want, in their personal, communal, and future pro-
fessional lives, to believe that they are acting rightly. They are, 
however, ethically naive in several senses. First, as is often the 
case with everyday morality, they do not fully understand their own 
system of value judgment. They are unable to articulate its funda-
mental principles or explain the decision-making process in indi-
vidual cases. More fundamentally, they are only dimly aware of the 
problematic nature of "moral reasoning," of the difficulties inherent 
in conflicts of ethical points of view. Applied ethics, then, cannot 
consist simply in classroom discussions of "hot" moral questions. 
Such exchanges result in neither clarification nor understanding. 
Instead, the first order of business should be to explore the nature 
of values and the problems of meaning and validation of moral 
claims. The second major task, I believe, is a survey ofthe various 
traditional approaches to moral judgment. In this way, students 
"A rational understanding of various ethi-
cal traditions enables us to approach 
these debates with sensitivity and a spirit 
of cooperation." 
begin to see ethics not as a jumble of personal sentiments 
gathered from who knows where, but as a systematic, reasoned 
approach to fundamental questions. They also begin to see their 
own values in relation to these systems. The student who vaguely 
justifies a course of action "because it's better for everybody 
involved" comes to understand the structure of utilitarianism. 
Another who disapproves of a behavior because "it's against 
nature, isn't it?" gains a much richer, clearer idea of what this 
means. Personally, I cherish the conviction that such enhanced 
understanding improves one's ethical functioning in "real life." 
With a reasoned grasp on basic principles and a sense of the 
process of applying them to situations, one's moral choices are 
more likely to be part of a coherent whole. The individual trades 
paSSionate attachment to rubrics and slogans for thoughtful judg-
ment. At the same time, systematic study of one's moral philos-
ophy imparts awareness of its limits and vulnerabilities, thus mak-
ing conflict and uncertainty a bit easier to understand. 
A second important contribution of the applied ethics course is 
the light it casts on one's adversaries in moral conflict. In a society 
as astonishingly pluralistic as our own, conflicting value systems 
hover around dozens of issues large and small. It does no good to 
brandish phrases like "no decent person could approve ... " or 
"everybody knows that you ought to .... " Michael Levin insists that 
"telling right from wrong in everyday life is not that hard" and that 
complacency-shattering conflicts between principles "are not 
likely to be faced by many people." But what if two people are 
approaching a relatively easy moral decision from two different 
value systems, say, natural law versus divine command theory? 
They will easily, confidently draw conflicting conclusions. Or all 
parties may agree on principles but weigh and apply them differ-
ently when they conflict. Contra Levin, conflicting values are a 
common feature of our moral life. And, thinking about the students 
in a medical ethics course, such situations are inevitable in health 
care where people of all sorts of backgrounds must come together 
to make difficult, painful choices. A rational understanding of 
various ethical traditions enables us to approach these debates 
with sensitivity and a spirit of cooperation. The alternative is too 
often the shrill, vindictive rhetoric that makes the current polariza-
tion within our community on the abortion issue. 
A final point on the uses of applied ethics courses, particularly 
the biomedical variety, concerns the development of personal 
identity. Values and moral choices are intensely important to our 
sense of self, of who we are. Exploration of these issues can be a 
powerful tool for developing self-awareness. No doubt Michael 
Levin would find this claim much too "touchy-feely." Isn't this a lot 
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of navel contemplation? What's the point of examining ethics as a 
key to one's own nature? Why not just get on with life? 
As the philosopher said, "the unexamined life is not worth 
living." People absorbed in high-pressure preparation for a pres-
tigious career have precious little time for examination of them-
selves or their goals. "Do I really want to do this?" "Why have I 
chosen this goal?" "What approach is best suited to the person I 
am?" "What other things are important to me?" Too often these 
questions go unasked; and, as a result, there are a lot of unhappy 
professionals out there. 
To me, the best unforeseen dividend of the medical ethics 
course is the reflection it encourages in many students. Why do I 
think that? an individual may ask. And what does it mean in terms 
of the way I want to live my life and the person I want to be? Against 
Michael Levin, I would argue that the "practical significance" of 
"philosophical reflection on the existence and nature of values" is 
profound and invaluable. 
Is There No Place For Reason? 
By 
James W. Walters, Ph. D. 
Associate Professor of Christian Ethics 
Faculty of Religion 
Lorna Linda University 
Michael Levin in his popular piece "Can Ethics Be Taught?" 
paints a morally insightful picture using hyperbole and caricature. 
First, the painter's bold language: "Ethics courses are an utterly 
pointless exercise." "Abstract knowledge of right and wrong no 
more contributes to character than knowledge of physics contrib-
utes to bicycling." 
Second, the artist's compelling message: What society needs is 
citizens with character, and character comes from good parenting 
more than ethics classes. 
Levin, like a political cartoonist, makes his pointthrough overkill. 
Fine, let's just distinguish the message from the medium-even if 
the writer doesn't. 
In my mind's eye I can see how Levin's words might yield a 
two-phase cartoon. Scene one: a professor leading 25 medical 
students in an animated analysiS of a case study-but in the 
cartoon, the whole scene existing under a big X, with the caption, 
"Just Say No." Scene two: big daddy making clear, plodding 
footprints across the room, with little tyke, shin-to-heel, dutifully 
in footsteps. 
The big daddy-little tyke scene has much going for it. 
The ethical life, essentially, is not logical reasoning about diffi-
cult moral issues. Much more basically, it is a fitting life which flows 
from our character-which you and I inherited and learned before 
we could begin to choose and sort. Beginning in infancy we 
receive certain subjective feelings and predispositions which are 
indelibly set. We don't wait until we are 12-or 18-and then 
choose the sort of persons we will become! Long before that time, 
our basic emotions are set. And those emotions-to a great 
extent-are us. Emotions are predispositions which determine 
how we will fear, hate, love, enjoy, feel guilt and shame. We don't 
choose the blueprint of our character, much as we might in decid-
ing on a house style. We, to a great extent, receive it. Aristotle was 
correct: right living or ethics has first to do with good habits. These 
habits are not cognitive activities, but are ingrained emotional 
responses. And the habits of the heart are first set by parental 
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example and discipline. More than most of us realize, we are chips 
off "the ole block" -or at least off other blocks. We humans are 
incredibly social beings. 
But is there no place for reason? Isn't the feature which sets us 
apart from the lower animals our capacity for reason? Absolutely, 
but in a significant sense, cognitive reason is a subset of a more 
total organism. It doesn't exist aside from our emotions, but 
alongside them. Reason hopefully guides them, but surely it does 
not undergird them. 
"The ethical life ... is a fitting life which 
flows from our character-which you and I 
inherited and learned before we could 
begin to choose and sort." 
Take the emotions of guilt and shame-emotions which are 
indispensable to the moral life. These emotions are universal, 
appearing in us as children. It is precisely these emotions which 
psychopaths lack in significant ways. A psychopath may have 
very sophisticated reasoning-may score high on Kohlberg's 
moral development scale! High IQ and reasoning ability do not 
necessarily yield good ethics. 
We must not attempt to divorce emotion from reason. Their 
complementarity is natural. In the words of psychologist Sidney 
Callahan our brain stores information as "cognitive-affective con-
structs." Have you ever been grasping for recall of an event or 
idea-it won't come back, but you immediately sense a feeling 
tone about that thing that still eludes your cognition? That image 
you are grasping is either positive or negative, affirming or 
threatening-and then your mind latches onto the image, and your 
feelings were right, even before you had the rational substance! 
The big daddy-little tyke scene, I was saying, has much going 
for it. But I'm sorry, Mr. Levin, it isn'tthe whole story. As loveable as 
little tykes are, who wants to remain one forever? Yes, the charac-
ter blueprint is determined early, and that blueprint is essential-
but you might wantto later make some modifications-knock out a 
wall, reconstruct the kitchen, even add a room. It's still the same 
house, but for good reasons it's been modified. 
Let me return to and build on-and conclude with-the two-
phase cartoon metaphor. Yes, we walk in our parents' footsteps, 
and gratefully so. But who wants to remain in infancy-as well-
wired as the infant may be! Later, to sit in a circle discussing ethics 
can be an intellectual feast for mature adults who realize that 
moral life can be delightfully-sometimes dreadfully-complex. 
"Exploration of these issues can be 
a powerful tool for developing self-
awareness." 
A decent ethics class, Mr. Levin, builds on good, emotion-based 
habits. It doesn't offer simple, pop answers to public issues. A 
good ethics class accomplishes at least three things: It stimulates 
the moral imagination; it hones moral analysis; it elicits a sense of 
moral obligation. 
Moral imagination. Why are the habits my parents taught me 
good? Are they good for all people in all times? In what ways is the 
moral life a boon to happiness rather than a drag on life's joy? Is 
self-fulfillment enhanced by-or deterred by-the fulfillment of 
others' legitimate interests? Is ethical reflection merely needed in 
life's big dilemmas, or do countless decisions-big and small-
have an ethical component? 
( 
Moral analysis. In a recent discussion of euthanasia, a student 
sincerely cited the 6th commandment as the Christian answer to 
the issue. Upon further analysis and discussion several rather 
rucial discoveries were made: 
-A ban on killing is not absolute in the Bible; God commanded 
deaths in certain circumstances. 
ethics presupposes personal freedom and responsibility; further, 
ethics classes are only one influence among so many in determin-
ing behavior. Ethics classes can-and there is some evidence 
that they do-influence students to join in respectful, principled 
deliberation about particular cases which arise in, e.g., a hospital 
setting. This in itself is a significant contribution. 
-The word "kill" in the commandment is better translated 
as "murder." 
Finally, can ethics be taught? Yes. Most basically in the home. 
But significantly for the inquiring adult in the classroom as well. 
-Personal life is sacred because it is created in God's image. 
-Euthanasia is not mentioned in the Bible; and the related notion 
of suicide is not discussed, but stories of suicide are told without 
conclusions about the rightness/wrongness of the practice. 
Moral obligation. To openly discuss good and bad, right and 
wrong, principles and virtues, is to implicitly teach obligation-that 
we are obliged to do the right, to be good persons. Will ethics 
classes make morally superior students? Not necessarily. For 
References: "Ethics Courses: Useless," New York Times, Novem-
ber 25,1989; Daniel Callahan, "Goals in the Teaching of Ethics," 
in Ethics Teaching in Higher Education, Daniel Callahan and 
Sissela Bok, eds., NY: Plenum Press, 1980; Sidney Callahan, 
"The Role of Emotion in Decisionmaking," Hastings Center 
Report, June/July, 1988. 
Cruzan - continued 
brain death characterized by total cessa-
tion of function from the neck up, includ-
ing the brain stem, and all depend on 
something that happens to a body. Man 
as a "soma" is defined anatomically, 
physiologically, and neurochemically, 
and everything that happens to and 
within him-thought, reason, emotion, 
memory, living and dying-are all 
)hysiologic, neurochemical events. ) 
A third view of man which is gaining 
increasing acceptance is expressed in 
an address by professor Paul Tillich 
delivered before the New York Society 
for Clinical Psychiatry in 1960, under the 
title, "The Meaning of Health." Tillich 
said to the gathered doctors: 
When I spoke of dimensions of life, 
there was implied a rejection of the 
phrase "levels of life." This must now 
be made explicit. Man should not be 
considered as a composite of several 
levels, such as body, soul, spirit, but as 
a multidimensional unity .... he is a unity 
which unites all dimensions. This doc-
trine stands against the dualistic theory 
which sees man as composed of soul 
and body; or body and mind; or body, 
soul, and spirit, etc. Man is one, uniting 
within himself all dimensions of life-
an insight which we partly owe to the 
recent developments of medicine, 
especially psychiatry. [He could have 
added, recent theology and biblical 
scholarship.] As confirmation of this 
idea, one may refer to psycho-somatic 
medicine. But although this is not 
\ incorrect, one should not forget that a 
hyphen between "psycho" and "soma-
tic" represents the statement of a 
problem and not a solution. 
This point of view has increasingly 
come to characterize the thought of a 
number of individuals who were formerly 
advocates of the somatic reduction. 
Philosopher Karl Popper and neuro-
physiologist Sir John Eccles collaborated 
a few years ago on a book bearing the 
seminal title, The Self's Brain, a title 
suggesting that the self is not identical 
with or reducible to its chief organ-the 
brain. 
Neurophysiologist Roger Sperry ofthe 
California Institute of Technology (Sperry 
received one-half of a Nobel Prize for his 
work on the commissurotomized brain) 
discussed the new emphasis recently in 
an article reproduced in The Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy. The article 
was an extended version of his accept-
ance speech in Stockholm. In the article 
Sperry says: 
In essence, consciousness was 
conceived to be a dynamic emergent 
of brain activity, neither identical with, 
nor reducible to, the neural events of 
which it is mainly composed .... con-
sciousness was not conceived as an 
epiphenomenon, inner aspect, or other 
passive correlate of brain processing 
but rather to be an active integral part 
of the process itself, exerting potent 
causal effects in the interplay of 
cerebral operations. In a position oftop 
command at the highest levels in the 
hierarchy of brain organization, the 
subjective properties were seen to 
exert control over the biophysical and 
chemical activities at subordinate 
levels .... On our new terms, conscious-
ness, as a holistic systemic property 
and an active dynamic part of high-
order brain processing, is now put 
within the province of science and is 
something that cannot be ignored 
where science wants an explanation 
of higher brain activities. In effect, this 
change means that the whole value-
rich qualitative world of inner-con-
scious, subjective experience, the 
world of the humanities, that has long 
been explicitly excluded from the 
domain of science on materialist prin-
ciples, is now reinstated .... ln the pres-
ent view, conscious phenomena are 
different from, more than, and not 
reducible to, neural events, though it is 
correct to say that conscious phenom-
ena are built of neural events as 
elements and perhaps also of glial and 
other cerebral events .... On the fore-
going terms, psychology and psy-
chiatry are best interpreted as distinct 
disciplines in their own right, not reduc-
ible or identical to neuroscience or 
behavioral biology. In other words, 
The meaning of the message will not 
be found in the chemistry of the 
ink.' .. .The development of an inner 
subjective world may thus be viewed 
broadly as part of the evolutionary 
process of freeing behavior from its 
initial primitive stimulus-bound condi-
tion, providing increasing degrees of 
freedom of choice and originative 
central processing. 
Unfortunately, as it relates to the ethical 
issues met with at the edges of life, this 
wholistic point of view has not yet made 
its most serious impact-though we are 
moving in that direction particularly in our 
definition of death. For most of human 
history, as well as today, death has been 
thought of as something that happens to 
a body, no more nor less. Death involved 
the disintegration of body tissues or the 
cessation of body organ-system func-
tions. More recently, for a number of 
reasons including the need for viable 
organs for transplantation, the loss of 
function of a specific organ, the brain, 
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has gained legal currency. But death is 
still defined in "thing" terms, death of the 
whole brain including the brain stem. 
This most recent definition, while pro-
viding the specificity that good law 
requires (the criteria are sufficiently 
rigorous that certainty is virtually assured) 
leaves us in a position of practical 
awkwardness in some situations where 
we are unable to do what seems hu-
manely appropriate to many of us. Karen 
Quinlan and Nancy Beth Cruzan are 
prime examples. What this paper is sug-
gesting is that it may be time for us to 
allow the philosophic developments of 
recent years to affect our clinical and 
legal judgment in perplexing circum-
stances such as these. 
Were we to define death in wholistic 
terms, that is, where the whole person is 
thought of as being greater than the sum 
total of its anatomic, physiologic, neuro-
chemical parts, and is not reducible to 
them, where the essential person is 
conceived of in functional rather than 
"thing" terms, an actual or potential self, 
absolutely dependent upon its material-
istic base but not the same thing as that 
base, we might be able to bring a 
measure of reason to the ethical process 
in these matters. 
How shall we characterize this essen-
tial self? First, we must recognize that the 
self is like "mind" not a "thing" word; in 
other words, not to be confused with 
brain. The self consists of an actual or 
potential complex of actions, interac-
tions, and functions that include con-
sciousness, self-consciousness (the self 
is both aware and aware that it is aware), 
volition, creativity, the capacity for choos-
ing, for making decisions, for being 
responsible, and possessing the capac-
ity to interact with others possessing these 
qualities and the surrounding real and im-
agined environment. 
The death of the self, which is the 
ultimate event toward which all of our 
other current definitions of death may 
pOint, occurs at the point where these 
qualities are irrevocably lost-even if 
much ofthe material base for life remains 
intact-including a brain-stem. Somatic 
death and self-death may occur at the 
same time, and they often do. From a 
wholistic standpoint, the self cannot sur-
vive the death of its chief bodily organ, 
the brain. An accurate diagnosis of brain 
death always implies self-death. But the 
point is, for purposes of our present 
discussion, the self may die before 
somatic death, indeed perhaps a long 
time before, as in the persistent vegeta-
tive state. Karen Quinlan suffered self-
death 9 years before the death of her 
body including her brain. One patient 
survived a persistent vegetative state for 
37 years and 111 days, not once during 
that time exhibiting any evidence of 
being a living self, and, we might add, it 
was a meaningless and very costly 37-
plus years. 
Nancy Beth Cruzan's case raises 
special problems. Unlike many persis-
tent vegetative cases, it is difficult to 
know if Nancy Beth has any degree of 
surviving se/fhood. To visitors and those 
who attend her she seems alive. Her 
eyes blink and she tends to follow 
sounds and show other minimal evi-
dences of responsiveness. Is this purely 
reflex, and thus somatic, activity? Or is 
Nancy Beth still "in there" somewhere? 
Cruzan thus illustrates both the diffi-
culty and danger of going down that 
"slippery slope." It is usually not difficult 
to determine brain death based on the 
standard criteria. But se/fhood involves a 
far more subtle and subjective decision. 
Often the evidence is indirect, depending 
on objective, somatic markers. Indeed, at 
present, brain death may be the only 
reliable marker of self-death we have, 
since it always signals its presence. But 
surely it may be possible in some 
circumstances for something short ofthe 
loss of everything from the neck up 
(including brain-stem) to be accepted as 
life's terminus. (It goes without saying, of 
course, that the determination may call 
for a reasonable lapse of time and a 
shared judgment such as a hospital 
ethics committee.) Surely it was not too 
difficult a judgment to make in the case of 
Karen Quinlan. It might not be too diffi-
cult, at least eventually, to make the 
decision for Nancy Beth Cruzan either. In 
the absence of certainty, benefit should, 
of course, always be given to doubt. (At 
the beginning of life it should not be 
difficult to judge an anencephalic fetus or 
infant as never even having a self in its 
future.) 
Even when the diagnosis of self-death 
is fairly obvious, due to its inherent, 
subjective subtleties, what comes after 
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should be surrounded by precautions 
not usually necessary when the deter-
mination is solely that of somatic death. 
Even were it legal, surely anything,r 
resembling active euthanasia would be 
inappropriate. The right to die should 
never include the right to be killed-for 
the sake of all of us-and especially here 
since the fact of death in self-dead 
persons may often not be impelling to 
everybody involved. Withdrawal of life 
support, including forced feeding by 
gastrostomy tube, when it becomes clear 
that all we are doing is to sustain somatic 
tissue meaninglessly and without hope 
of a restoration of personal function, is a 
different matter, provided the self-death 
is generally agreed upon. The dead self 
must "mean" corpse to the involved 
persons before actions appropriate to a 
corpse are carried out. This may call for 
some fairly formalized, even ritualized, 
actions such as a formal declaration of 
death. 
Obviously, it is going to take time, 
education, changes in law, even a set of 
formal criteria generally agreed upon 
(such as the Harvard Criteria for brain-
death), and perhaps some new laboratory 
and other tests before society at large is 
going to be ready to add self-death to the 
list of death definitions. But there are 
good reasons to start thinking about it. 
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